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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #03580-87/1
24 August 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence


THROUGH: National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: Walter L. Barrows
National Intelligence Officer for Africa

SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa

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A Warning and Forecast meeting on Sub-Saharan Africa was held on 18 August 1987. The attached report has not been coordinated with meeting participants but is being circulated to them. If they believe their views have been misinterpreted, or if they have significant additional concerns, I'll report further to you.


Walter L. Barrows

Attachment:
NIC #03580-87

This memorandum is UNCLASSIFIED
when separated from Attachment.

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NIC #03580-87
18 August 1987

WARNING AND FORECAST REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

1. Intelligence community representatives discussed the following topics at the monthly warning meeting on 18 August.

2. Brief Items:

(a) Chad - Aozou Fighting. CIA led the discussion of prospects for further Chadian gains against remaining Libyans in the Aozou Strip, particularly those at Aozou Airbase.

- President Habre is committed to dismantling Aozou Airbase. Recent Libyan air attacks from it add urgency to achieving this goal, and he is disposed to launching an offensive as soon as possible.
- Logistical constraints may retard Habre's timing somewhat, however. Chadian resupply activities have been slowed by a malfunctioning C-130 and cessation of French C-160 flights to the north.
- In the meantime, the Chadians will mop up Libyan forces that twice failed in counterattacks against Aozou village.

Habre's strategy may be once again to lure Libyan forces into leaving their strongholds on offensive missions, so that his troops can ambush them and follow their retreat through emplaced defenses such as minefields. INR suggested that Habre might wait as long as a month before attacking Aozou Airbase, wanting time to prepare fully and erode Libyan morale through harassment. Most analysts believed that he will take action sooner than that, however, since he cannot afford a war of attrition now that Libyan supply lines are shorter than his.

Warning Note: We continue to believe that Habre will succeed in taking Aozou Airbase, but again caution that his margin for error is narrow and his forces could sustain serious damage should they miscalculate. Moreover, even if the airbase is disabled, Chadian forces in the north will still be vulnerable to airstrikes launched from southern Libya.

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(b) Angola: Is a South African Incursion Imminent? DIA's presentation emphasized that a South African cross-border attack from northern Namibia to assist UNITA could occur with little warning.

- A recent deployment of Mirage aircraft to northern Namibia was probably for reconnaissance over southern Angola.
- G-5 artillery pieces are out of garrison and may have been moved across the border, perhaps for use in the Cuito Cuanavale area should Angolan troops appear able to drive successfully on Mavinga.
- South African Defense Forces have built up generally in northern Namibia for annual training activities, providing potential cover for an incursion.

DIA believes that if the South African's calculate that their intervention is required to stall an attack on Mavinga, ground rather than air forces may be the preferred instrument. They probably wish to avoid risking scarce air assets, particularly in light of Angola's new air defense capabilities in the battle zone.

Warning Note: With the Angolan government offensive against UNITA picking up steam, the likelihood of South African intervention is rising. South Africa can bring to bear significant force on short notice. The most likely target would be Cuito Cuanavale, especially if Mavinga seems seriously threatened.

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(c) Mozambique - Rising Insurgent Activity. DIA in its presentation indicated that RENAMO has intensified its efforts in recent months:

- Only Zambezia Province has seen a decrease in incidents of hostility. Elsewhere, RENAMO is stepping up initiation of hostile contacts.
- Both the Mozambican and the Zimbabwean military forces in country are suffering rising WIA.
- Attacks on facilities in the Beira Corridor are increasing.

Warning Note: RENAMO seems now to be in a position to launch its seasonal offensive almost anywhere in the country once the rains begin this fall.

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(d) Mauritius - Election Prospects. CIA predicted that the election to take place on 30 August will be close--and fairly conducted--but that the party alliance led by Prime Minister Jugnauth will retain power. The outcome will hinge on campaigning over three issues:

- Both Jugnauth and his principal opponent, Paul Berenger, head of the opposition Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM), are taking credit for Mauritius' impressive economic performance since 1982.
- The MMM is exploiting the scandal in which several police and government officials were caught dealing in drugs.
- Berenger, a white, is attempting to compete for support within the Hindu community.

The advantages of incumbency as well as Berenger's tenuous ties with Hindu voters will likely tip the scales toward Jugnauth. Should the MMM unexpectedly win, domestic policy would see few changes, but Mauritius would shift somewhat leftward in foreign relations by:

- asserting louder claims to Diego Garcia,
- moving a bit closer to Soviet positions on global and regional issues,
- and possibly renewing relations with Libya.

Warning Note. None.

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3. Main Item: South Africa - Strikes, Bombs, and Nuclear Isolation. CIA led the discussion on internal developments, which produced consensus that:

- The mineworkers' strike is unlikely to end soon. While both management and the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) leadership would like to extricate themselves from the confrontation, NUM won't settle without wage increases and the mine owners believe that layoffs and their one-month stockpile allows them time to sap the workers' will.

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- The government is reluctant to intervene and would probably initiate a harsh crackdown only if strike violence threatened to get out of hand or if the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) called for sympathy strikes. Should this occur, of course, South Africa would be on the brink of another round of widespread violence.
- The government seems also to be exercising restraint in the wake of the 30 July ANC bombing that injured 68 outside a military headquarters in Johannesburg. While a stern warning was issued to the governments of Zambia and Mozambique, South Africa for now is likely to be more selective than in the recent past in making cross-border strikes, hitting only hard targets.
- President Botha seems to be seeking a relaxation of tensions, both domestically and abroad, to facilitate carrying out his reform program. By pushing back the next general election, he has bought himself three more years to convince whites that his is the best course. He is also seriously contemplating the release of at least one imprisoned ANC leader, not only as a gesture to promote black-white dialogue but probably as well to gain favorable publicity in the West. The upcoming Commonwealth meeting as well as President Reagan's Anti-Apartheid Act report to Congress this fall are no doubt on his mind.

CIA also led a discussion on the threatened suspension of South Africa from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA):

- The IAEA General Conference beginning 21 September will be heated, with both South Africa and Israel the targets of growing expulsion movements motivated largely by political considerations.
- Were South Africa suspended despite US efforts, Pretoria would perceive yet another example of the futility of relying on Washington.
- Suspension would have little practical effect for South Africa, however. It already has a virtually self-sustaining nuclear fuel program, so, if anything, the absence of IAEA involvement would add to South Africa's freedom of maneuver. Nonetheless, the South Africans value international contacts with experts in this field (particularly with regard to nuclear safety) and want to stay in the IAEA.


Warning Note: If current strike activities expand and provoke substantial government intervention, widespread and perhaps sustained violence will likely erupt. South Africa stands a good chance of suspension from the IAEA, which would be a damaging precedent for the international "safeguards" regime.

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SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa

The following components were represented at the Sub-Saharan Africa warning meeting:

EXTERNAL:

DIA/DIO
DIA/DE-4
DIA/DB-8D
DIA/JSI-5B
Air Force
Navy
State/INR
NSA

INTERNAL:

DDI/ALA/AF
DDI/OIA
DDI/OIR
DDI/LDA
NPIC
FBIS
DDO/AF
ICS/OHC
O/NIO/Warning

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